The State of Utah v. Jeffrey Dee Almy : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
The State of Utah v. Jeffrey Dee Almy : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald S. Fujino; Roger K. Scowcroft; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Almy, No. 940674 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6292
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFREY DEE ALMY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940674-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B), 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and 
58-37-8(2) (b) (ii), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, 
Judge, presiding. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
Attorneys for Appellant 
QHOlpJ!: 
FILED 
^ah Court of Appeals 
JAN 3 0 19S5 
Marilyn M. Branch 
c,e
*_Q?.fi!S.CQui*. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEFFREY DEE ALMY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 940674-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4 (2) (b) (iii) (B) , 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) , and 
58-37-8(2) (b) (ii), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, 
Judge, presiding. 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 2 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
THE OFFICER'S ACTIONS WERE NOT JUSTIFIED AT ITS 
INCEPTION AND WERE EXCESSIVE IN SCOPE. 8 
A. POLICE ACTION WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE 
THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL TRESPASS 9 
1. The State Did Not Establish a 
Prima Facie Case; There Was Inadequate 
Notice. 10 
2. Sorting Through Abandoned Garbage 
in a Dumpster Does Not Constitute 
Substantial Interference. 11 
3. Property Open to the Public 
Includes Abandoned Garbage in a 
Dumpster. 11 
B. DEPUTY LATHAM EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE 
PERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE 16 
CONCLUSION 22 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) 8, 20 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) 12, 14, 15 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) 16 
State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276 (Utah App. 
1992) 19, 20, 21 
State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) 16 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994) 8, 9, 16, 
18, 19, 21 
State v. Montoya, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah 1994) . 7 
State v. Palmer, 802 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1990) . . . 2 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) . . . . 7 
Steele v. Beinholt, 747 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1987) . . 12, 13, 14 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 8 
United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 
1973) (per curiam) 16, 17, 18 
United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 
1979) (per curiam) 11 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Or.Rev.Stat. § 164-205(4) (1983) 13 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1302 1, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-79 1, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 (2) (b) (iii) (B) 1, 3, 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 1, 3 
ii 
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (ii) 1, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-105 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 1, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-205 1, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206 1, 9, 10, 
11, 13, 14, 
15, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-5 1, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 1, 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) 1 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 1, 9, 16, 
21 
iii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JEFFERY DEE ALMY, : Case No. 940674-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2) (f), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a) . 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
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Const. Amend. IV 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Almy's motion to 
suppress? If two persons do nothing more than rummage through an 
unlocked and accessible garbage dumpster situated in a public alley, 
is an officer's detention of both persons unjustified and 
inadequately based on the alleged minor infraction of criminal 
trespass? 
"In considering the trial court's action in denying 
defendant's motion to suppress, we will not disturb its factual 
evaluation unless its findings are clearly erroneous. However, in 
assessing the trial court's legal conclusions based on its factual 
findings, we afford it no deference but apply a 'correction of error 
standard.'" State v. Palmer, 802 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990); 
see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994) ("We conclude 
that the proper standard of review to be applied to a trial court 
determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness, as opposed to being a fact 
determination reviewable for clear error"). 
2. Assuming the initial detention was not improper, was the 
resulting detention excessive and unreasonable and justifiable only 
through the benefit of hindsight? If the initial basis for a 
detention is an infraction, does an officer act unreasonably by 
continuing the detention for a warrants check when such a check 
admittedly has no relationship to the underlying charge and is done 
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merely with the hope of uncovering information which can be used to 
justify the continued nature of the detention? The standard of 
review for issue one also applies here. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION 
The case at bar presents two issues novel to our state. 
Although a United States Supreme Court opinion has implicitly 
touched upon a matter relevant to Mr. Almy's situation, Utah's 
appellate courts should address directly whether rummaging through 
garbage is an act of criminal trespass. In addition, Utah case law 
has not considered the excessive scope argument as it relates to 
infractions. Unlike intrusions based on suspected felonies or 
misdemeanors (e.g. traffic stops), case law does not specifically 
address whether the initial detention for an infraction may be 
prolonged further by an officer who has no reason to suspect 
wrongdoing but nonetheless initiates a warrants check in hopes of 
finding something outstanding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2) (b) (iii) (B), 
58-37-8(2) (a) (i) , 58-37-8(2) (b) (ii) , in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis, presiding. On July 11, 1994, Mr. Jeffery Dee Almy 
entered a guilty plea to the above offense, conditioned upon his 
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right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
(R 41-47, 142-60) (plea proceedings, dated July 11, 1994); see also 
(R 73-131) (suppression proceedings, dated May 5, 1994). 
On October 7, 1994, following a continuance of the time set 
for sentencing, (R 55, 57), the court sentenced Mr. Almy to a term 
of zero-to-five years in prison, together with a $5,000 fine and an 
85% surcharge. (R 169). The sentence was immediately stayed and 
Mr. Almy was instead placed on three years probation. (R 58-59; 
169-74). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 14, 1993, Officer Cory Latham was in the area 
of 4151 South Redwood Road, near the Savers store, "a second-hand 
type of a store" alongside a row of businesses. (R 74-76; Motion to 
Suppress Transcript, dated May 3, 1994 [hereinafter "MS"] at 5-7). 
Behind Savers, a mercantile establishment open to the public, is a 
roadway through which cars freely travel to and from other 
locations. (R 88-89; MS 19-20). 
Near the row of businesses, in an area approximately ten to 
twelve feet behind the wall of Savers, is a thirty-foot long and six 
or seven-foot deep dumpster. (R 75-76, 90; MS 6-7, 21). Officer 
Latham believed that Savers used the dumpster "to discard their 
items from their store into." (R 76; MS 7). The officer, however, 
did not know who actually owned the dumpster, (R 89; MS 20), which 
may have been one of many receptacles used to remove discarded 
merchandise. (R 76, 86; MS 7, 17). The dumpster apparently was not 
the type of bin used for food garbage. (R 76; MS 7). "Clothing, 
- 4 -
broken appliances, stuff of that nature" are examples of discarded 
items found in or around the dumpster. (R 89; MS 20) . The dumpster 
is not locked and it has no top. (R 94; MS 25). 
"No trespassing" and "no scavenging" signs were posted on 
the wall of the Savers store above a loading dock area, (R 76, 84; 
MS 7, 15), possibly in reference to discarded items located on the 
Savers dock or on the ramp leading up to the dock. (R 89; MS 20). 
However, no such signs were on the dumpster itself. (R 84, MS 15). 
Officer Latham noticed two individuals standing inside the 
accessible dumpster at about 11:35 p.m., on December 14. (R 75-76; 
MS 6-7) . Latham asked them to step out of the open garbage bin and 
requested their identification. (R 81; MS 12). Both individuals 
complied. (R 81; MS 12) (one person was not identified by name; the 
other person was Jeffery Almy). 
The officer pointed out four signs on the wall of Savers, 
ten to twelve feet away from the dumpster, which evidently had led 
Latham to believe that "they couldn't be back there in the 
dumpster." (R 90, 92; MS 21, 23). However, Officer Latham declined 
to cite either person for the alleged infraction of rummaging 
through garbage. (R 92; MS 23) (the alleged infraction, criminal 
trespass, was the citable offense). Instead, the officer detained 
both persons and radioed dispatch for a warrants check. Latham 
admitted that such a check had nothing to do with them being in the 
dumpster. (R 82, 93; MS 13, 24). 
The warrants check produced nothing on the first 
individual, who then was released. (R 92; MS 23). Since the second 
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individual, Jeffery Almy, "had a $600 warrant of arrest", the 
officer handcuffed him and transported him to the jail. (R 97; MS 
28). During the booking process, two small containers containing 
drugs were discovered in Almy's jacket. (R 98-99; MS 29-30). 
After a motion to suppress proceeding, the trial denied 
Mr. Almy's motion and issued the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
Findings of Fact 
1. On December 14, 1993, deputy Latham observed the 
defendant standing in a garbage dumpster located in an 
alley way behind the Savers Store located at 4154 South 
Redwood road. It was 11:35 P.M. and it was dark. 
2. The area was posted above the dumpster with "no 
trespassing and "no scavenging" signs. 
3. The deputy approached the defendant and asked him 
what he was doing. The defendant indicated that he was 
"rooting" through the dumpster. The deputy asked the 
defendant for identification. The defendant provided the 
deputy with a Utah Drivers license with the defendant's 
name and picture on it. 
4. The deputy ran a warrants check on the defendant 
which came back in a few minutes with an outstanding 
warrant for the defendant's arrest for shoplifting. The 
deputy arrested the defendant on the outstanding warrant 
and transported him to jail. 
5. The defendant was searched at the jail and two 
packages of Methamphetamine were recovered from the 
defendant's person. 
Conclusions of Law 
From the foregoing findings of fact the Court hereby 
concludes: 
1. The testimony of deputy Latham was credible. 
2. The deputies actions resulted in a detention of the 
defendant. 
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3. The detention was justified because the deputy 
personally observed the defendant committing a trespass 
violation. 
4. The detention of the defendant by deputy Latham was 
reasonable, short in duration and limited in scope, and for 
a limited purpose and intrusion, to allow the deputies to 
run a warrants check on the defendant [and] did not 
significantly extend the period of detention beyond that 
which was reasonably necessary to effect the arrest of the 
defendant or the issuance of a citation. 
(R 38-39) (attached as Addendum B). 
On July 11, 1994, Mr. Jeffery Almy entered a conditional 
guilty plea to unlawful possession of a controlled substance, 
reserving his right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to 
suppress. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988); State 
v. Montoya, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah 1994). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding that a detention for 
criminal trespass, an infraction, was justified by an officer's 
sighting of two individuals rummaging through a garbage dumpster. 
By statute, it is a defense to criminal trespass if the involved 
property is open to the public and the conduct does not 
substantially interfere with the owner's use of the property. Since 
the property at issue is garbage, there is neither an owner nor is 
there interference. The garbage dumpster itself is open, unlocked, 
and located in a public alley. The dumpster falls under the "open 
to the public" provision, a subsection which has been broadly 
interpreted. 
The court also erred in not finding that the resulting 
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detention was excessive. After Deputy Latham requested 
identification, he should have expressed his concerns or simply 
issued a citation and let them go. Instead, he continued the 
interference for a warrants check, a detention which admittedly had 
nothing to do with the underlying infraction. The scope of the 
detention must be strictly tied to and justified by the 
circumstances. The officer's detention exceeded the scope here, 
however, as he simply wanted more information of the detained 
persons before he was willing to let them go. 
ARGOMENT 
THE OFFICER'S ACTIONS WERE NOT JUSTIFIED AT ITS 
INCEPTION AND WERE EXCESSIVE IN SCOPE 
"To determine whether a search or seizure is 
constitutionally reasonable, we make a dual inquiry: (1) Was the 
police officer's action 'justified at its inception'? and (2) Was 
the resulting detention 'reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place'?" 
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132-33 (Utah 1994) (citing Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). To be justified, the officer must 
act with a reasonable suspicion, an action "based on specific, 
objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests 
require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the 
seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, 
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). An objective and reasonably based 
suspicion must justify both the initial intrusion and the resulting 
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detention. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132-33. 
The court here, however, ruled contrary to existing law. 
See (R 3 9) (Conclusions of Law, numbers 3 & 4). In contrast to its 
order, the officer's actions were not justified at its inception 
and, as discussed below, the scope of the detention was also in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.1 
A. POLICE ACTION WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BECAUSE 
THERE WAS NO CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
The court below concluded that "The detention was justified 
because the deputy personally observed the defendant committing a 
trespass violation." (R 39) (Conclusions of Law, number 3). The 
pertinent part of the criminal trespass statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-206, states: 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass, if . . . 
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he 
enters or remains on property as to which notice 
against entering is given by . . . 
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come 
to the attention of intruders. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section: 
(a) That the property was open to the public when 
1. The involved were preserved. During the motion to 
suppress proceeding, defense counsel explained that the officer's 
actions were not justified at its inception because "the officer did 
not have a reasonable suspicion that criminal trespass was 
occurring. The second argument we make is that a warrant check 
exceeded the permissible scope of the original detention for 
criminal trespass." (R 104; MS 35); see generally (R 104-29; MS 
35-60). The inadequacy of the notice was addressed, too. (R 89; 
106; MS 20, 37). 
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the actor entered or remained; and 
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially 
interfere with the owner's use of the property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2), -206(4). 
Although not to be encouraged, rummaging through garbage is 
an act tolerated by the language of the above statute. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-206 (4) . 
1. The State Did Not Establish a Prima Facie 
Case; There Was Inadequate Notice 
The court below believed that Mr. Almy's situation fell 
under subsection (2) (b) (iii) of the criminal trespass statute. 
(R 123; MS 54); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2) (b) (iii). For the 
subsection to apply, the State must prove the "Posting of signs 
reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-206(2) (b) (iii) . First, because garbage was involved, 
Mr. Almy would not be considered an intruder. See infra Points A.2. 
& A.3. Second, the involved signs were on the wall of the Savers 
store, they were not on or in the garbage dumpster. (R 76, 84; 
MS 7, 15) . Deputy Latham's testimony merely established that Savers 
had used the dumpster. The officer did not know who actually owned 
the dumpster nor did he know who owned the right to claim an 
intrusion. (R 89; MS 20). The "no trespassing" and "no scavenging" 
signs were a good ten to twelve feet away from the dumpster and 
separated from the bin by an alley way. (R 90, 92; MS 21, 23). The 
signs only served as notice for the items left on Savers loading 
dock area or the ramp leading up to the dock. (R 89, 106; MS 20, 37). 
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Unlike the loading dock and the ramp area -- which Savers rightfully 
owned, the discarded garbage and the dumpster were not covered by 
the signs. See infra Points A.2 & A.3. 
2. Sorting Through Abandoned Garbage in a 
Dumpster Does Not Constitute Substantial 
Interference 
"Rooting" through garbage does not substantially interfere 
with the owner's use of the property. See (R 38); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-206(4) (b) . Importantly, the property at issue is garbage and 
the claimed area of trespass is a dumpster in a public alley. 
(R 8 9; MS 20); see also infra Point A.3. The court below 
specifically found that Mr. Almy was in a "garbage dumpster located 
in an alley way behind the Savers Store . . . " (R 38; Finding of 
Fact, number 1) (emphasis added). The investigating officer, deputy 
Latham, similarly acknowledged that the dumpster was used for 
"discard [ed]" items. (R 76; MS 7). Since the property had been 
discarded, it was not being used and there was no owner. Cf. United 
States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) 
("[T]he act of placing garbage for collection is an act of 
abandonment which terminates any fourth amendment protection"). The 
incident occurred at "11:35 P.M. and it was dark." (R 38; Finding 
of Fact, number 1). Businesses were closed. There was no 
interference. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(4)(b). 
3. Property Open to the Public Includes 
Abandoned Garbage in a Dumpster 
The trial court also failed to recognize that the dumpster 
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-- which had no top, was unlocked, and located in an public alley 
where cars freely travelled, (R 75, 89, 94; MS 6, 20, 25) -- was in 
fact open to the public. According to the United States Supreme 
Court, "It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or 
at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, 
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (footnotes 
omitted). In addition to plastic garbage bags, the accessibility of 
dumpsters located at the side of a public alley was more 
specifically alluded to in Greenwood: 
It is not only the homeless of the Nation's cities 
who make use of others' refuse. For example, a 
nationally syndicated consumer columnist has suggested 
that apartment dwellers obtain cents-off coupons by 
"mak[ing] friends with the fellow who handles the 
trash" in their buildings, and has recounted the tale 
of "the 'Rich lady' from Westmont who once a week puts 
on rubber gloves and hip boots and wades into the town 
garbage dump looking for labels and other proofs of 
purchase" needed to obtain manufacturers' refunds. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40 n.3 (emphasis added and citation omitted). 
Rubber gloves and hip boots were not used in Jeffery Almy's 
case, but reality cannot ignore the fact that indigent people like 
Mr. Almy often take advantage of the accessible nature of dumpsters 
to search for "prizes" which others have discarded. In Utah, the 
definition of property "open to the public" has received a broad 
interpretation. See Steele v. Beinholt, 747 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 
1987) . 
In Steele, plaintiff Vietta Steele was charged with criminal 
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trespass for refusing to*leave a privately owned nursing home 
facility. The criminal charge, which eventually was dismissed, 
remained integral to a civil suit filed by Steele against the 
nursing home facility. Steele, 747 P.2d at 434. If the facility 
could prove criminal trespass, Steele's cause of action failed. By 
comparison, if Steele could prove that she did not trespass, her 
lawsuit continued. Id. 
At trial, Steele offered a proposed instruction stating, "It 
is a defense to prosecution under this section [criminal trespass]: 
(a) That the property [facility] was open to the public . . . and 
(b) [Steele's] conduct did not substantially interfere with the 
owner's use of the property." _Id. at 434 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-206(4)). The trial court refused her instruction, however, 
on the grounds that the statute did not give her the right to be on 
private property. 747 P.2d at 434. 
On appeal, this Court reversed. Finding no such distinction 
between public versus private property, the Steele Court held: 
We do not agree with the trial court's restricted 
interpretation and application of section 76-6-206(4). 
If the legislature had intended this statutory defense 
to be so limited, the statute could have been drafted 
to more clearly reflect such an intent. Rather, we 
believe "open to public" to have a broader application, 
such as the definition provided by the Oregon state 
legislature. Or.Rev.Stat. § 164.205(4) (1983) states: 
"Open to the public" means premises which by their 
physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice or 
lack thereof or other circumstances at the time 
would cause a reasonable person to believe no 
permission to enter or remain is required. 
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We therefore conclude "property . . . open to the 
public" in section 76-6-206(4) is not limited to 
public, i.e. government-owned property. 
Steele, 747 P.2d at 434 (construing Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(4)); 
see also id. at 434 (Steele's defense remained viable even though a 
prima facie case for criminal trespass had been established). 
On occasion, reasonable people search desperately through 
trash cans to find something they may have inadvertently thrown 
away. More often than not, "down-and-out" people rummage 
intentionally through dumpsters for items inadvertently thrown 
away. Whether disadvantaged or desperate, the "open to the public" 
definition encompasses both garbage in trash cans and dumpsters 
located in a public alley behind a Savers store. 
The Greenwood case also supports Mr. Almy's no trespassing 
position from another angle. The high court 
conclude[d] that respondents exposed their garbage to 
the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth 
Amendment protection. . . . Moreover, respondents 
placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose 
of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, 
who might himself have sorted through respondents' 
trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do 
so. Accordingly, having deposited their garbage "in an 
area particularly suited for public inspection and, in 
a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the 
express purpose of having strangers take it," 
respondents could have had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded. 
Furthermore, as we have held, the police cannot 
reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from 
evidence of criminal activity that could have been 
observed by any member of the public. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41 (citations omitted). 
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Of course, Jeffery Almy's situation does not involve a 
Fourth Amendment claim of privacy in the garbage. However, if 
instead of Mr. Almy, assume deputy Latham had discovered items in 
the dumpster which suggested criminal activity (e.g. receiving 
stolen property or "fenced" property). Would a resulting successful 
police investigation be undercut by the officer's initial 
discovery? Such "fruits", under Greenwood, would not be 
suppressed. 486 U.S. at 37-41; see also id. at 42 ("of those state 
appellate courts that have considered the issue, the vast majority 
have held that the police may conduct warrantless searches and 
seizures of garbage discarded in public areas"). Moreover, under 
Utah's criminal trespass statute, such conduct could not be 
considered a trespass because the officer's discovery was in a 
dumpster "open to the public" and there was no "interference" with 
the owner's use of the property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(4); cf. 
supra Point A.l. 
Irrespective of a role-reversal, garbage is garbage. 
Mr. Almy's rummaging and an officer's discovery both constitute 
permissible conduct because of the accessible and discarded nature 
of garbage. Compare Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 41 ("Our conclusion that 
society would not accept as reasonable respondents' claim to an 
expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an area 
accessible to the public is reinforced by the unanimous rejection of 
similar claims by the Federal Courts of Appeals") with Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-206(4) ("It is defense to prosecution [of criminal 
trespass, an infraction, if] . . . the property was open to the 
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public . . . [and] [t]he actor's conduct did not substantially 
interfere with the owner's use of the property"). 
The court here erred in concluding that "The detention was 
justified because the deputy personally observed the defendant 
committing a trespass violation." (R 38). No trespass occurred. 
The detention was not justified. 
B. DEPUTY LATHAM EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE 
PERMISSIBLE INTERFERENCE 
Once "a stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). "Both the 'length and 
[the] scope of the detention must be "strictly tied to and justified 
by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.'" 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1127 (quoting State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 
(Utah 1991). If, as discussed above, Deputy Latham's detention was 
not justified at its inception, "the evidence derived from it must 
be suppressed." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1134. Similarly, even assuming 
that the initial detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment, if 
the scope of the detention also was unjustified or excessive, 
evidence derived therefrom must be suppressed. See id.; cf. 
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764. 
In United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(per curiam), a jaywalking case, the Ninth Circuit expressed its 
concern with a police detention which extended beyond "the time 
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necessary to obtain satisfactory identification from the violator 
and to execute a traffic citation." I_d. at 91. Although the stop 
itself was justified and the request for identification was proper, 
the continued detention of the jaywalker solely for the purpose of 
running a warrants check was excessive. The police "had no 
reasonable grounds to be suspicious that there might be a warrant 
outstanding against him [the jaywalker.]" _Id. Accordingly, the 
appellate court affirmed the district court's decision to suppress 
the "fruits" resulting from the unreasonable detention. Id. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the initial intrusion here was 
justified, deputy Latham then unreasonably continued to detain 
Mr. Almy for the unrelated purpose of running a warrants check. 
According to the court below, "The detention of the defendant by 
deputy Latham was reasonable, short in duration and limited in 
scope, and for a limited purpose and intrusion, to allow the 
deputies to run a warrants check on the defendant [and] did not 
significantly extend the period of detention beyond that which was 
reasonably necessary to effect the arrest of the defendant or the 
issuance of a citation." (R 39, Conclusion of Law, number 4). 
The court's ruling, however, erroneously claimed that the 
detention could continue for the purpose of "effect[uating] the 
arrest of the defendant . . . " (R 39). An arrest cannot be made 
for an infraction, however, and continuing the detention for that 
purpose falls outside the scope of the initial justification. Cf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-5 (a warrant of arrest may only be issued 
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for public offenses categorized as felonies or misdemeanors; 
infractions are not included). 
The court's conclusion also improperly intermingled the 
detention necessary for the issuance of a citation with the 
detention necessary for running a warrants check. Under Utah law, 
deputy Latham could "demand [an appropriately stopped suspect's] 
name, address and an explanation of his actions." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-7-15. The statute, in line with Luckett, allows nothing beyond 
such preliminary information absent reasonable cause to believe that 
further action is required. See id.; cf. Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135 
("existing Fourth Amendment law precludes an officer from extending 
the length or scope of a traffic stop to investigate a suspicion of 
wrongdoing which does not rise to the level of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion") (emphasis added); 873 P.2d at 1132 ("If 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise, 
the scope of the stop is still limited"). 
Deputy Latham had no reason to detain Mr. Almy beyond the 
time it would take to issue a citation. When the deputy confronted 
Mr. Almy and another unnamed individual in the garbage dumpster, 
Latham asked them to get out. They both complied. (R 81; MS 12). 
When the deputy asked them for identification, they both complied. 
(R 81; MS 12). Mr. Almy "provided the deputy with a Utah Drivers 
license with [his] name and picture on it." (R 38; Finding of Fact, 
number 3). Deputy Latham did not doubt the validity of the 
identification nor did he view the alleged infraction to be very 
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serious (the officer released the unnamed individual without issuing 
a criminal trespass citation). (R 92; MS 23). 
Instead of merely taking the time to incorporate the 
provided information into a citation, the detention continued for no 
reason other than, "I [deputy Latham] don't decide what I'm going to 
do [i.e. issue a citation or release them] before I get all the 
information [from the warrants check.]" (R 94; MS 25). In the 
deputy's own words, "The warrants check had nothing to do with the 
fact that they were trespassing in the dumpster." (R 93; MS 24). 
But see Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 ("The officers must 'diligently 
[pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or 
dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary 
to detain the defendant") (citations omitted). 
The situation in State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276 
(Utah App. 1992), is distinguishable from Mr. Almy's case. In 
Figueroa-Solorio, a lone pedestrian in a known crime area violated a 
misdemeanor statute when he jaywalked across a busy street. Having 
recently "witness[ed] an incident in which a jaywalker almost cause 
a vehicular accident" at about the same location, the involved 
police officer(s) knew firsthand that jaywalkers pose a potential 
danger to themselves and to the commuting traffic. See id. at 281 
(Orme, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in 
part) . The officers approached the individual, who had gotten into 
a parked car, and requested his identification. The jaywalker 
responded that he did not have any. I^d. at 277. The officers had 
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the person write his name down in a notebook. The officers then 
checked a warrants book in their patrol car and found that the name 
given had outstanding warrants. A computer check verified the 
outstanding warrants and a subsequent search revealed drugs. See 
id. Although the search there was allowed, fundamental differences 
exist here. 
The constitutionality of "seizures involves a weighing of 
the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree 
to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity 
of the interference with individual liberty." Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. at 50-51. In Figueroa-Solorio, the evidence reflected that 
jaywalkers not only jeopardize their own safety, they also threaten 
or potentially compromise the safety of others. The gravity of 
public concern is served when police attempt to prevent harm to 
pedestrians, to passing drivers, and to summoned emergency 
personnel. By comparison, a garbage "rooter" affects no one. The 
public interest is not advanced by seizing the downtrodden. 
By statute and classification, Utah's legislature has also 
drawn a distinction between the jaywalker in Figueroa-Solorio and a 
person stopped for criminal trespass. Jaywalking is a misdemeanor 
offense, punishable by a term of imprisonment. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 41-la-1302; 41-6-79; 76-3-204. A criminal trespass allegation 
like the one here, however, is viewed only as an infraction with no 
possibility of imprisonment. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-205(1); 
76-6-206(3). The less serious nature of an infraction requires less 
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intrusive conduct by the*police. Greater justifications must fuel a 
continued detention when infractions are involved. 
In Figueroa-Solorio, a lone pedestrian was stopped for 
jaywalking although such an offense was left uncharged because of 
later developing circumstances. 830 P.2d at 281. In Jeffery Almy's 
case, Mr. Almy and another individual were seen rummaging through a 
garbage dumpster. The unidentified individual was released, 
however, despite the alleged trespass violation. Moreover, because 
neither person was cited for their alleged identical conduct, the 
public interest was not advanced. The initial basis for a detention 
was never a legitimate concern; it served only to "justify" a 
detention which continued even though the officer admittedly did not 
"suspect any other criminal conduct [.] " (R 91; MS 22); cf_. Lopez, 
873 P.2d at 1135 ("existing Fourth Amendment law precludes an 
officer from extending the length or scope of a traffic stop to 
investigate a suspicion of wrongdoing which does not rise to the 
level of probable cause or reasonable suspicion") (emphasis added). 
Finally, in Figueroa-Solorio, the stopped jaywalker did not 
have identification and he immediately entered a car. 83 0 P.2d 
at 277. Although a jaywalking citation could have been issued, the 
officers there received no verifiable identification. In addition, 
the officers had reason to be concerned about other prospective 
driving violations since they knew the defendant had no driver's 
license. By comparison, in Mr. Almy's situation, the officers never 
questioned the validity of Jeffery Almy's driver's license -- which 
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incidentally contained enough information for a citation. The 
off icers should have allowed Mr. Almy to walk away from the dumpster, 
The detention here was neither strictly tied to nor 
justified by the inconsequential nature of the infraction. Because 
the continued detention was unreasonable, the fruits should have 
been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Almy respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
lower court's order denying his motion to suppress and to remand for 
further proceedings. 
SUBMITTED this ^0 day of January, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM A 
MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 41-la-1303 
41-la-1302. Violations class C misdemeanor. 
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class C misdemeanor, unless 
otherwise provided. 
41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right-of-way — Limits on pe-
destrians. 
(1) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a 
marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall 
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles on the roadway. 
(2) A pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where there is a pedestrian 
tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing shall yield the right-of-way to all 
vehicles upon the roadway. 
(3) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are in 
operation, pedestrians may not cross at any place except in a marked cross-
walk. 
(4) A pedestrian may not cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless 
authorized by official traffic-control devices, and if authorized to cross diago-
nally, shall cross only as directed by the appropriate official traffic-control 
devices. 
*8-37-8 (2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful:
 # intentionally to possess or use a (i) for any person knowingy and J g g J ™ ^
 a
P
v a i i d prescnp-
controlled substance, unless :t w * ^ m e u ^ ^
 rf 
K & S S g ^ i T S S - authorized by this subsec 
76-3-105. Infractions. 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly desig-
nated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a 
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
76-3-205. Infraction conviction - Fine, forfeiture, and dis-
qualification. 
(1) A nerson convicted of an infraction may not be imprisoned but may be 
«ubVecttoTfin? forfeSure, and disqualification, or any combination. 
« ) WhenevS a p ^ n i s 'convictedtf an infraction and no punishment is 
s p S ^ X i r s S may be fined as for a class C misdemeanor. 
76-6-206. Criminal trespass. 
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person thereon or 
damage to any property thereon; or 
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; 
(iii) Is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for tie 
safety of another. 
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on 
property as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) Personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone 
with apparent authority to act for the owner; or 
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude in-
truders; or 
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of 
intruders. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor. A viola-
tion of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section: 
(a) That the property was open to the public when the actor entered or 
remained; and 
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's 
use of the property. 
be made. 
A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon finding probable cause to 
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense. If the 
offense charged is: 
(1) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at any time of the day or night; or 
(2) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be made at night 
only if: 
(a) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do so on the war-
rant; 
(b) the person to be arrested is upon a public highway or in a 
public place or a place open to or accessible to the public; or 
(c) the person to be arrested is encountered by a peace officer in the 
regular course of that peace officer's investigation of a criminal of-
fense unrelated to the misdemeanor warrant for arrest. 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question 
suspect — Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reason-
able suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the acf of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Jeffery D. Almy, 
Defendant. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Case No. 941900422FS 
Hon. Leslie A. Lewis 
This matter was set for hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress on May 3, 
1994 in front of the honorable Leslie A Lewis , District Court Judge. The state was 
represented by Richard G. Hamp , Deputy County Attorney. The defendant Jeffery D. 
Almy was present and represented by his attorney Roger K. Scowcroft. Testimony was 
taken and argument was presented to the Court by the State and the defendant. The Court 
being fully advised hereby finds the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. On December 14,1993, deputy Latham observed the defendant standing in a 
garbage dumpster located in an alley way behind the Savers Store located at 4154 South 
Redwood road . It was 11:35 P.M. and it was dark. 
2. The area was posted above the dumpster with "no trespassing" and "no 
scavenging" signs. 
jo ui+*~*» 
3. The deputy approached the defendant and asked him what he was doing. The 
defendant indicated that he was "rooting" through the dumpster. The deputy asked the 
defendant for identification. The defendant provided the deputy with a Utah Drivers 
license with the defendant's name and picture on it. 
4. The deputy ran a warrants check on the defendant which came back in a few 
minutes with an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest for shoplifting. The deputy 
arrested the defendant on the outstanding warrant and transported him to jail. 
5. The defendant was searched at the jail and two packages of Methamphetamine 
were recovered from the defendant's person. 
Conclusions of Law 
From the foregoing findings of fact the Court hereby concludes: 
1. The testimony of deputy Latham was credible. 
2. The deputies actions resulted in a detention of the defendant. . 
3. The detention was justified because the deputy 'observed the defendant 
committing a trespass violation. * , ~ \ Jl 
The detention of the defendant by deputy Latham was reasonable, and the • 
rfendant dia not significantly extena the ^ a warrants check on the de dant 
periocr of detention beyond that which was reasonably necessary to effect the arrest of the 
defendant or the issuance of a citation. 
Dated this ?%? day of .1994. (7 
Approved as to Form: 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
ROGER K. SCOWCROFT 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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